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a in 
to his to 
contends that the district denying his motion because 
d court improperly determined the police officer had a reasonable suspicion to 
a traffic stop for a dog sniff the initial purpose of stop was complete. 
that the known to the officer were insufficient to establish a 
suspicion of criminal activity. Due to the unlawfully prolonged stop in 
violation Fourth Amendment, that the court erred by 
failing to suppress the evidence obtained from the subsequent search of the vehicle. 
22, 2014, 
pounds). (R., 
him over court 
§ 37-2732B(a)(1 )(B) 
a hearing, 
, pp.22, 25-26.) The State filed an 
Information charging Mr. Kelley with trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.23-24.) 
These arose out a traffic stop and search of a vehicle driven by 
, p.70.) 21, 4, 7:17 ., Sheriffs Office 
Detective Kyle Moore observed a 2005 Toyota with a Nebraska license plate on 
Interstate 84 (hereinafter, 1-84). (R., ) He estimated the vehicle's speed was 85 
miles per hour in an 80 miles per hour speed zone. (R., p.70.) Detective Moore 





by him visibly 
contact, and a 




" (R., p.70; 
33, 1-p.34, L.5.) 
provided to him (Def.'s A, Elmore 
was not 
that Mr. Kelley 
it "was summer "avoiding 
(R., p.70.) 
Mr. Kelley was "slightly shaking" 
Vol. 1, 1 p.12, 1 8.) also 
(Tr. Vol. I, 
1, 19, 1 
nervous behavior." 
did any 
of a stolen vehicle (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, Ls.6-20.) 
After making contact with Mr. Kelley, Detective Moore returned to his patrol car 
and requested dispatch to check the driver's status and confirm warrants. (R., p.70; 
1 There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the 
suppression hearing and entry of plea hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains 
the sentencing hearing. 
2 
I, 1 
nervous 1 L 1.) 
m., four minutes after the first encounter. (R, p.70.) Detective 
Kelley and up more a 
I, 1 
owner as his 
owner Mr. 
Elmore County 





name. (R., 's 







that was to a once he area. (R., 
I, p.16, 3.) Detective Moore did not see anything the passenger 
compartment to suggest a long road trip, such as luggage. (R, p.71, Tr. Vol. I, p.15, 








I, p.38, 1 
Moore determined at this time that he was not going to Mr. Kelley for the traffic 
(R., p.71; Tr. I, p.38, 1.) "that the 
his had changed." (R., p.71.) nn~~=~~····~···~athe 






0 returned to Mr. Kelley's for 7:28 p.m., 
after the initial stop. (R., p.71.) he was no 
investigating initial purpose of the 
I, p.42, 0.) 
in (R., p.71.) 
, p.71.) Detective Moore then 
am I to leave?" (R., 
to Detective Moore's observation of 





the time of 
if there 
drugs or 
am I free to 
and Kelley 
nervousness, 
a for a sniff 
around the exterior of the vehicle. (R., p.71.) Detective Moore directed Mr. Kelley to exit 
the vehicle, and one of the back-up officers frisked him. (R., p. 71.) Detective Moore 
depioyed the dog at 7:29 p.m. (R., p.71.) The dog alerted at 7:32 p.m. (R., p.71.) 
4 
38.) 
a sniff. (R., 




1, The district 
Order Denying 
to a plea 
of trafficking in 











of I § 
guilty to an 
1 )(A) (at 
I, p.69, Ls.9-12.) Kelley reserved his right 
(R., pp.85, 89; Tr. Vol. I, his motion 
with years 
a timely from the 
01.) 
2 In the district court's initial order, it noted that it found and "[t]he parties agreed" that 
the three videos of the traffic stop were "unusable." (R., p.55 n.1.) In the corrected 
order, the district court revised its footnote to state that it found the videos "mostly 
unintelligible and unhelpful to deciding the case" because "[t]he wind drowned out much 
of the conversation." (R., p.69 n.1 .) 
5 
6 
that a of 
to th,::, \.!IV" 
a mere hunch or speculation, which is insufficient to justify the prolonged stop 
Fourth 
district court 
Due stop, Mr. Kelley submits 
his motion to 
Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a 
to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, (2012); see also V. 
156 Idaho 568, (Ct. App. (same). The of 
" 
of are de nova. v. 
1 109,111 (2013) (citing v. Munoz, 1 Idaho 121, 127 (2010)). 
When reviewing the district court's determination of reasonable suspicion, "the 
appellate court 'should care both findings of historical fact only clear 
error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges 
and local law enforcement officers."' Id (quoting Munoz, 149 Idaho at 127). "The 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence." State v. 
Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The Court "has defined 'substantial evidence as such 
reievant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion; it is more 
7 
"' V. , 1 
is 
C. 
Prolong The Traffic Stop For A Dog Sniff Of The Vehicle 
Fourth Amendment of the United protects citizens from 
I, 17 
people to 
"State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). "Article 
Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that '[t]he right of 
secure in their persons, effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."' State v. Green, 158 Idaho 
884, 886 (2015) (alteration in original). "Traffic stops constitute seizures under the 
officer's 
commit, a "Id. 
Morgan, 1 Idaho 112 (quoting v. Henage, 143 Idaho 
are when an 
articulable suspicion a , or is about to 
"[A]n officer may stop a vehicle to investigate if there is a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary traffic laws." State v. 
Edwards, 158 Idaho 323, 324 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 417 (1981 ); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208 (Ct App. 1998)). Mr. Kelley does 
not challenge Detective Moore's initial stop of the vehicle. ( See R., p. 72.) 
"A drug dog sniff may be performed during a traffic stop without violating the 




1609, 1615 (2015). In contrast to ordinary inquires 
135 
to a traffic stop, a 
wrongdoing."' 
, 40-41 (2000)). 
sniff "is a measure aimed 
original) (quoting Indianapolis v. 
a cannot prolong the 
"is not fairly characterized as 
stop. Id 
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on 
that can from 
v. Bishop, 1 804, 811 
law enforcement training 
Danney, 153 Idaho 410, but "[t]he officer, 
ord 
suspicion because a 
during a routine 
articulable facts and 
1 Idaho 112 
inferences facts " 
must be able to articulate 
something more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch."' United 
States v. Sako/ow, 490 U 1, 7 (1989); see also Morgan, 1 Idaho at 112 (same). 
"The test for reasonable suspicion is based on totality of the circumstances known 
to the officer at or before the time of the stop." Morgan, 154 Idaho 112. 
The Court of Appeals recently held in State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609 




by initiation V. 
U.S. 1, 19, 28-29 (1968). "Thus, evidence may not be introduced if it was 
by means of a search which were reasonably related in 
"'"'"'!J"' to the justification for their initiation." Id. at 29. "Where a person is detained, the 
scope of detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification." Perez-Jungo, 
156 Idaho at 617; see also Florida v. Royer; 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
Consequently, where the person is detained in a prolonged traffic stop, the scope 
of that detention must carefully tailored to underlying justification: the officer's 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. officer must have a reasonable suspicion 
drug-related criminal if specifically for 
deploying a dog to detect the odor of . To a dog sniff without a reasonable 
suspicion of drug-related criminal activity would be an unreasonable expansion of the 
justification for the seizure. See State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 564 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by officers 
prolonging stop for a dog sniff without reasonable suspicion of a "drug-related offense"). 
Although it is not required under Perez-Jungo for the officer to suspect a specific crime, 
i.e., drug possession versus trafficking, the officer must reasonably suspect that some 




he concluded his of traffic ." (R., p.75.) 
court identified the issue as whether "Detective Moore had 
upon resolution of the initial justifications for the stop, to continue the detention to 
investigation other possible crimes." (R., p.74.) The district court determined, "based on 
totality of the circumstances, Detective Moore had a reasonable suspicion to 
continue to detain Kelley for further investigation." (R., pp.75-76.) Mr. Kelley takes issue 
with one of the district court's factual findings and its determination of reasonable 
suspicion. 
1. 
"Drug Corridor" Findings 
facts 
suspicion was that 
determination 
was traveling on a "known corridor for drugs" 
from west coast states to "Nebraska specifically." (R., p.75.) The district court also found 
that "l-84 between Oregon (a source state) and, ultimately, Nebraska, is a known 
corridor." (R., p.70.) Mr. Kelley asserts that these findings are not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record. 
testimony on this subject provides: 
entirety of Detective Moore's 
Q. [By the prosecutor] One additional question. Do you recall - the 
registration for the vehicle, where was it registered to? 
A. The state was Nebraska. I believe Omaha. 
11 
common 
drugs from a source state. Commonly in our area it is the coast state 
to the Midwest. So I knew it to a consumer state for narcotics generally 
speaking. 
And based on your training 
a source state? 
A. Yes, it is. 
actual experience is Oregon generally 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.27, Ls.7-24.) In light of this brief testimony, the district court's factual 
finding that Mr. Kelley was on a "known corridor" from west coast states to "Nebraska 
specifically" was in error. (R., pp.71, 75.) Detective Moore's testimony does not provide 
any indication that "Nebraska specifically" was the consumer state for this precise travel 
route. Rather, Detective Moore testified that Nebraska was a consumer state "generally 
based solely on the fact that it happens to be in a in the Midwest. What 
is no on this " is no 
district court's finding that 1-84 specifically is known drug 
" (R., p.70.) Rather, according to Detective Moore's testimony, all individuals 
who happen to be traveling from any west coast state to the Midwest on any road in 
Idaho are on this drug corridor and subject to investigation. Mr. Kelley disputes the 
district court's finding traveling from any west coast state to "Nebraska specifically" 
via 1-84 is a "known corridor for drugs. 
evidence in the record. 
12 
findings are not supported by the 
stop a 
, p.75.) Therefore, this point forward, Detective Moore prolonged the traffic stop 
an unrelated purpose, which must be 
criminal activity. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615; Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho at 617; 
141 Idaho 564. 
Detective Moore did not have a reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop 
a dog sniff based on the information known to him prior to the second encounter. 
Moore had called for back-up after first due to Mr. Kelley's 
nervous behavior (his lack of eye contact, trembling, and pulsing carotid artery). 
, p. 70; Tr. Vol. I, 1 1 1 L.1.) 
for reasonable suspicion. 
71 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting no 
and holding 
behavior, standing alone, is 
268 F.3d 
nervousness alone 
not support reasonable amended by United States v. Chavez-
Valenzuela, 279 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Muehler v. 
U.S. 93 (2005). person's nervous behavior during a police encounter is of 
"limited suspicion it is common for 
people to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement 
regardless of criminal activity." State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285-86 (Ct. App. 2005); 
see also State v. Bly, No. 42637, 2016 WL 72522, at *2 (Ct. App. Jan. 2016) (noting 
that "iawful, is 
13 
nervous in 
suspicion to justify prolonged 
a 
a 
Similar to nervousness, the "known 
finding3 also is of little significance. At its core, this finding suggests that every 
individual traveling on 1-84 from the west coast to the Midwest is a suspected drug 
This is not a "specific, articulable" fact or rational inference thereof on which to 
a determination of reasonable suspicion. See Morgan, 154 Idaho 112. A driver's 
nervous behavior during an initial police encounter coupled with an out-of-state vehicle 
traveling west east on an is insufficient for a reasonable suspicion of 
drug-related criminal activity. Moreover, none of the other relevant facts support a 
determination of reasonable suspicion. Detective Moore did not observe that Mr. Kelley 
was by drugs or alcohol. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, 12-p.13, L.9, p.13, L.23-p.1 L.1, 
33, 1 was friendly. (Tr. I, p.36, 
L.3.) Mr. Kelley Moore's requests for his driver's 
registration, and , p.70; 's A, Elmore County 
Sheriff's Office Narrative.) The vehicle did not look stolen. (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, Ls.6-20.) In 
light of the totality of the circumstances, 
the second encounter does not 
activity to justify the prolonged stop. 
a 
known to Detective Moore prior 
suspicion of drug-related criminal 
3 Mr. Kelley assumes in arguendo that this finding is supported by the record. 
14 
3. Detective Moore Did Not Have A Reasonable Suspicion Of Drug-Related 
Criminal Activity When He Approached The Vehicle For The Third 
Encounter 
traffic stop prolonged prior to the Assuming 
encounter,4 Moore still lacked a reasonable suspicion of drug-related 
activity. By this time, Detective Moore had learned of Mr. Kelley's "suspicious story." 
(R., pp.70-71, 75.) Mr. Kelley continued to show signs of extreme nervousness (which 
is not unreasonable considering that a police officer continued to detain and question 
him without issuing a traffic ticket, purpose of the stop.5) Detective Moore saw no 
indicators of a road trip in the passenger compartment, but the vehicle had a trunk. 
(R., p.71, Tr. Vol. I, p.15, Ls.17-22, p.35, Ls.21-23.) Detective Moore also learned that 
Mr. Kelley was "free and clear-no warrants." (R., p. 71.) The vehicle had insurance, and 
the vehicle's registration did not come back stolen. (Tr. Vol. I, p.38, Ls.10-12, 1-
22.) In essence, Detective Moore knew that a nervous individual with a valid driver's 
license was driving a registered, insured vehicle from Oregon to Nebraska on the 
interstate. The fact that Mr. Kelley had an imprudent travel arrangement with a friend 
does not add 
criminal activity. 
support to the of a reasonable suspicion of drug-related 
Indeed, Detective Moore provided no clarification as if any, suspected 
criminal activity necessitated his further investigation. He simply testified: "I was 
furthering my investigation. I had reason to believe there was more going on," "there 
4 The State conceded at the suppression hearing that Detective Moore's initial 
investigation was over when he approached the vehicle for the third time. (Tr. Vol. I, 
P f::.5 ! - A 12) .v , L:S."f- . 
5 Detective Moore told Mr. Kelley during the first encounter that he was not going to 
write him a ticket for the traffic infraction. (Tr. Vol. I, p.36, Ls.8-12.) 
15 
"I was if 
an 
on." That is hunch or 'inchoate and 
on the part of the officer. Bishop, 1 Idaho at 811 
(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)); State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 
(Ct. App. 2005)). Recently, in Bly, the Court of Appeals held was no 
suspicion for a detention "articulated no basis 
justifying why" defendant's conduct was "consistent with criminal activity." 2016 WL 
The Court of Appeals that the to articulate 
something more than "a hunch based on proximity" or just "strange and suspicious" 
to support a reasonable inference that had committed or was 
a Id. in Bly, Detective 
suspicion criminal 
a dog 
from Detective vehicle "would not 
come light government's unconstitutional in prolonging the 
traffic stop a dog without reasonable suspicion. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 
180, 184 (Ct. 2005). Due to the unlawfully prolonged stop, submits that 
the district court erred by denying Kelley's motion to suppress. See Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through unconstitutional 
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